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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Heather Heard appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional 
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Heard 
challenges the denial of her motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Police responded to a hotel room for a report of a domestic disturbance in 
Heard's room. (Tr., p.44, L.16 - p.46, L.6.) Heard and Steven Harris had been 
observed arguing loudly more than once over the past two days. (Tr. p.9, L.17 -
p.14, L.5.) Upon arrival, Sergeant Thompson could see inside the room through 
the open curtains and open door and observed Heard motionless on a bed and 
Harris walking within the room. (Tr., p.46, L.7 - p.47, L.25.) 
When the officer attempted to get Heard's attention, she was "semi 
responsive [and] extremely groggy." (Tr., p.49, Ls.13-14.) Because the officer 
could not ascertain Heard's condition from outside of the hotel room and was 
concerned for her safety, he entered the room through the open door. (Tr., p.49, 
Ls.9-23.) As Heard finally responded and got up from the bed, a small plastic 
bag fell from her lap onto the bed. (Tr., p.50, Ls.9-11.) Once inside the room, 
law enforcement also viewed "two syringes soaking in some type of red liquid" 
that Harris had moved before they entered. (Tr., p.51, Ls.5-8.) 
The state charged Heard with possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.27-29.) Heard file a motion to suppress 
asserting there was "no basis for the officers to enter the room in which [she] 
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was staying in and it was done without a warrant." (R., p.35.) Following 
testimony at a suppression hearing, the court denied Heard's motion finding an 
exigency allowing entry into the hotel room without a warrant based on the 
"compelling need" of law enforcement to check on Heard. (Tr., p.98, L.19 - p.99, 
L.22.) Once law enforcement lawfully entered the room, the syringes observed 
in plain view were reasonably seized. (Tr., p.99, L.23 - p.100, L 12.) 
Heard entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, preserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress, 
and the state dismissed the remaining charge. (Tr., p.105, L.8 - p.112, L.18; R., 
pp.81-93.) The court placed Heard on a four-year period of probation with an 
underlying suspended sentence of two-years fixed followed by three-years 




Heard states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Heard's Motion to 
Suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Heard failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Heard Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Heard challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, contending the 
district court erred in concluding that the entry into her hotel room was justified 
by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-
10.) Heard's argument fails. A review of the record and the applicable law 
supports the district court's determination that the entry was constitutionally 
reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
The Warrantless Entry At Issue Was Justified By A Recognized Exception 
To The Warrant Requirement 
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. "A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls 
within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." 
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State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)); accord State v. Roias-
Tapia, 151 Idaho 479, 481, 259 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2011). "When a 
defendant has demonstrated that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, it 
becomes the State's burden to prove through presentation of evidence that an 
exception to the warrant requirement applied." State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 
558, 21 P.3d 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis omitted) (citing Coolidge, 403 
at 455; State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218-19, 984 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1999); 
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 481, 988 P.2d at 707); accord Roias-Tapia, 151 Idaho at 
481, 259 P.3d at 627. Contrary to Heard's assertions on appeal, a review of the 
record and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that the 
state met its burden of proving the existence of a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement with respect to the warrantless entry in this case. 
It is well settled that entries necessitated by "exigent circumstances" do 
not offend the warrant requirement. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S 499, 509 (1978); 
State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 129 
Idaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996). In determining whether 
exigent circumstances are present, the inquiry is "whether the facts reveal 'a 
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."' State v. 
Wren, 115 Idaho 618,624,768 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Tyler, 
436 U.S. at 509). "The test for application of this warrant exception is whether 
the facts as known to the [officer] at the time of the entry, together with 
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reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief that an exigency 
justified the intrusion." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 136 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 
2006) (citing State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 (Ct. App. 
2003)); accord State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75, 209 P.3d 668, 671-72 
(Ct. App. 2009); State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 470, 197 P.3d 327, 331 (Ct. 
App. 2008). "A law enforcement officer's reasonable belief of danger to the 
police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling is one type of exigency 
that may justify a warrantless entry." Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375, 209 P.3d at 672 
(citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 470, 
197 P.3d at 331 ). 
Following a hearing on the motion the court concluded "clearly there was 
reason to call for the police hearing [the dispute between Heard and Harris], 
particularly with what [the security guard] had heard and seen earlier that night." 
(Tr., p.97, Ls.17-19.) In concluding that the officer's entry into Heard's hotel 
room was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement, the district court found the window was "open or unshaded" (Tr., 
p.97, L.22) and the door was open (Tr., p.97, L.24). This allowed the officers to 
make the following observations: 
So what they knew was there was an argument very shortly before 
and now it's completely quiet, and in fact you have an unresponsive 
person laying on the bed. The testimony was a little bit different, 
one said face down, one said on the side, but you have a 
completely nonresponsive person shortly after long arguing. And 
there's been some question that there was no report of physical 
violence, but at that point the officers had every reason to be 
concerned about physical violence because of a nonresponsive 
person very shortly after an argument. So she wouldn't wake up 
very quickly and there was testimony about not knowing what her 
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condition was. And it could have been different things, head injury, 
intoxication, perhaps some other kind of injury that wasn't 
discussed, but they didn't know. 
(Tr., p.98, Ls.4-18.) There was "a compelling need to enter that room to check 
on Ms. Heard." (Tr., p.99, Ls.1-2.) The court subsequently concluded, upon 
these facts, that "the officers had every right to enter." (Tr., p.100, L.15.) The 
record supports the district court's conclusions. 
Before entering the hotel room, law enforcement had received a report of 
a domestic dispute from the hotel security guard who reported "there might be 
some domestic abuse because there was a lot of yelling [and] verbal 
confrontation." (Tr., p.46, Ls.4-6.) The reporting party had personally witnessed 
Heard and Harris arguing loudly outside of the front of the hotel (Tr., p.9, L.19 -
p.10, L.10), received a report of them arguing outside a gas station (Tr., p.33, 
Ls.10-16), and heard them "getting boisterous in their room again" (Tr., p.12, 
Ls.14-15) immediately before calling law enforcement. 
When officers arrived at the hotel, they observed Heard and Harris 
through an unobscured window and an open door. (Tr., p.46, L.15 - p.47, L.25.) 
Heard was lying face down on one of the two beds in the room and was not 
moving. (Tr., p.47, Ls.21-23.) The officer announced his presence and 
indicated he wanted to speak to the two of them. (Tr., p.47, Ls.16-25.) When 
Heard remained motionless, the officer asked the male to wake her up. (Tr., 
p.49, Ls.3-12.) When that was unsuccessful, the officer entered the open door 
into the room to make contact with Heard. (Tr., p.49, Ls.17-21.) Heard was very 
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slow to get up and the officer was not able to determine if she was "groggy, just 
waking up, or intoxicated, [or portraying] odd behavior." (Tr., p.50, Ls.2-4.) 
Viewed in their totality, the above facts amply support the district court's 
conclusion that the entry of the hotel room was justified by the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Given the report of a 
possible domestic disturbance, the fact that the couple in question had been 
seen twice arguing earlier in the evening and heard arguing loudly before the call 
to police, the fact that Heard was motionless in a bed and unresponsive to a 
police presence mere feet away, the fact that officers could not ascertain Heard's 
condition from outside the room, and the fact that the potential domestic suspect 
was walking freely about the hotel room, the police acted objectively reasonably 
in entering the room without a warrant to ensure the safety and well-being of 
Heard. 
Heard challenges the district court's conclusion that the entry was 
justified, contending the state failed to prove the existence of an exigency. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) On appeal, Heard concedes that, if she "had not woken 
up at all," police "may have had cause to enter the room to see if she was 
unconscious and needed medical assistance." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) That is 
the situation the court found existed in finding an exigency and denying Heard's 
motion to suppress: "[S]he wouldn't wake up very quickly and there was 
testimony about not knowing what her condition was." (Tr., p.98, Ls.14-15.) 
Although Heard argues she was awake and in the process of getting up 
when the officer entered the hotel room (Appellant's brief, p.9 (citing Tr., p.55, 
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L.23 - p.56, L.6, p.60, L.22 - p.61, L.2)), that claim is inconsistent with the 
evidence presented: 
Q: [counsel for co-defendant Harris]: 
[Harris]? 
A: [Sgt. Thompson]: Yes, sir. 
So you were talking to 
Q: He tried to wake [Heard] up and she actually responded, 
didn't she? 
A: Not really, sir. Some slight movement and some mumbling. 
Q: And so there was movement, wasn't there, and some 
mumbling? 
A: Maybe some slight moving, sir. 
Q: But you didn't want to wait for him to get her up so you went 
in at that time? 
A: No, sir. That's not the case of whether or not we're waiting 
to get her up. When he said, Hey, the cops are here, you need to 
get up, and she doesn't move hardly at all, if any, that's a pretty 
clear sign there might be something wrong. As I stated earlier 
before, usually when the police arrive and they start questioning 
people, everybody in the dwelling gets up off their feet. I mean, 
that's the point where we have to control people, tell them to sit 
down and stay put and stuff like that. I thought it was odd behavior. 
That's just my opinion. 
Q: Because you thought that it was odd behavior, that's why 
you went into the room? 
A: No, sir. I was genuinely concerned for her well being. I was 
called in for a domestic dispute, these guys have been having 
problems for two days, she's unresponsive, I have no idea whether 
she's unconscious or if she's been drugged or she's intoxicated, 
possible head injury. I don't know the circumstance of her well 
being so that's my general concern. 
(Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.57, L.2.) 
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Given the nature of the report and the suspicious circumstances attendant 
thereto, it was entirely reasonable for the officer to believe Heard was in need of 
assistance. Heard has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that 
the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
district court's order denying Heard's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 2th day of Janua 
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